ABSTRACT
The theme of this chapter is summed up by Cicero: infinite money, the sinews of war. War-making requires unending supplies of money. Happy is the country which has access to such supplies; almost as happy is the country which has access to a country which can provide such supplies. But complicated are the relations between two such countries. War accelerated Great Britain's1 decline from, and America's rise to, global power. Furthermore, at the same time it facilitated the transfer of power from one to the other. Indeed, the overarching structure of Anglo-American relations during the twentieth century has been the - perhaps unprecedented - transferral of power from one Great Power to another without being forced to it by defeat in battle. The intention in this chapter is to give a snapshot of the two countries at the outset of the twentieth century, and then briefly to trace the downward trajectory of Britain's independent war-making power, from 1900 to the present day. The chapter will begin with the Boer War, where turning to the United States was a matter of convenience, continue with the First World War, where it was a matter of strategic necessity, and the Second World War, where it was a matter of dire necessity, and end with the very different settings of the Cold and Falkland Wars. Beginning with convenience, this chapter will end with convenience.
