ABSTRACT
IN RECENT YEARS there have been several attempts to move beyond the unproductive moral and political gridlock that has tended to dominate discussion of abortion (Dworkin, 1993; Robertson, 1994). Ronald Dworkin, for example, has suggested that with the exception of a small number of extremists, there is in fact broad agreement that while fetal life deserves respect, its protection cannot take priority over the rights of the pregnant woman (Dworkin, 1993). And Dworking formulation appears to be an accurate encapsulation of the position at common law, and possibly under the Human Rights Act 1998:1 namely that a fetus cannot be protected at the expense of the pregnant womans bodily autonomy. But if it is now settled law that a fetus is not a legal person,2 and that its interests cannot
trump those of the pregnant woman, then there may be some tension between developments in the common law and the Abortion Act 1967.
