ABSTRACT
The 'primacy of foreign policy', it has been argued, was the guiding principle in the policies pursued by German states from the late eighteenth to the midnineteenth century.4 Simms suggests that the main reason for the primacy of foreign policy was the geopolitical 'sandwich' position of the German states between France and Russia, especially the precarious situation of the smaller German states bordering on France, which was considered the chief disturber of European peace in early-nineteenth-century Europe. During the Wars of Liberation, Germany's re-establishment as a player in European politics depended on British, Russian and Austrian support.5 At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, it was decided that the geopolitical exposure of the German states required the creation of a German Confederation to provide for their security.6 The Confederation was supposed to restore the European 'balance of power' by tying both Prussian and Austrian power to the defence of Germany, however, without establishing a centralized government that would enable Germany to disturb the peace. Therefore the Confederation assumed the character of a loose association for purely defensive purposes. In addition, th~ juxtaposition of Aus-
provocative attitudes, and recommended moderation.50 Russia, being without ideological partners among the Great Powers after the revolutions in Berlin and Vienna, mobilized troops in Poland and looked simultaneously for entente with Britain and even revolutionary France in order to restrain Prussia and Germany.51 Nesselrode's warning to Prussia to stick to reason and not embark on a 'Hegelian' power policy appealed to Friedrich Wilhelm's sense of Christian piety.52 When the first Polish revolts turned against German domination, the sympathy of the German national movement quickly waned, and the RussoGerman crisis was over.53
