ABSTRACT
The NUM's relationship with Harold Wilson's New Labour demonstrates the tensions and contradictions at the heart of British social democracy. The pit closure programme demonstrated the relative powerlessness of the NUM in Labour's internal politics because of history, loyalty, and a judgement that any Labour government was better than a Conservative government. Even if the NUM had been more assertive there is no evidence that the Labour government would have responded. The closures illustrated the tension between Labour's modernisation ethos and the problems modernisation created for the coal-mining communities. The NUM was reticent and defensive, afflicted by a deep inhibition against challenging an elected government which, in turn, reinforced the NUM's commitment to parliamentary politics and lobbying. The NUM had insufficient political resources to challenge the dominant civil service view of the coal industry. The NUM was actively excluded from core decision making on energy policy by a policy network which was pro-nuclear despite coal's centrality to electricity generation, and passively excluded from core decision making in the NCB by the industry's consultation and conciliation structures.
