ABSTRACT
This chapter presents historical analysis of the political manipulation of the National Supreme Court in Argentina so as to unveil how the politicians have manipulated the court by tracing the different ways in which justices have stepped off the bench from 1916 to 2014. Until the massive impeachment trial of four of the five members of the Supreme Court in 1946, justices had remained on the bench for long periods, the main reason for their departures being biological (death) and legal (retirements). However, since 1946 justices have been highly unstable on the bench, with the executive in most cases having forced their retirement. Since the 1946 impeachment trial constitutes a critical junction in the history of the executive–court relationship, this chapter shows how the events after the impeachment trial have reinforced practices undermining the independence of the justices and increasing the cost of changing the direction of events. Overall, the historical analysis of the last eight decades of the country revealed that politicians have changed their repertoire of forced retirements (both institutional and non institutional mechanisms) as well as the duration in time taken to achieve them.
