ABSTRACT
This chapter uses original data to test the theory at the National Supreme Court. This chapter answers: when is the executive able to manipulate the composition of the court? And what political factors explain judicial instability on the bench? The first section discusses the methodological issues related to the operation of the variables. The following sections present the results of competing risk survival models. The evidence shows that the preferences and incentives of the executives can affect the stability of the justices on the bench. Specifically, the data reveal that politics matters when accounting for induced retirements from office whereas non-political reasons matter for non-induced retirements. Justices with similar political preferences as the ruling executive are less likely to be forced to step off the bench than justices with different political preferences. Moreover, political loyalties between justices and executives were proved to be more sophisticated than expected, since what matters is the loyalty of the justices to the faction of the political party of the appointing executive rather than to the political party itself. Overall, judicial turnover is not a random event but rather the result of the strategic political behavior of the ruling executive.
