ABSTRACT

In referring to Brecht’s early notes on a dialetical d ram a Jo h n Willett concludes that ‘T he term “ d ialectical” went into cold storage, to be taken out again in a som ew hat different context at the end of B recht’s life’. (BT, p. 46)1 As any reader of B recht’s prose writings can see, however, his interest in dialectics did not disappear in 1929 or 1930. If anything, it was consolidated in the M arxist and philosophical studies conducted from 1926 through to 1941.2 H ere, am ongst other topics Brecht exam ined dialectics in relation to social class and as a m ethod of revolutionary thinking, presenting a sketch of the political role of intellectuals in ‘perfo ra ting ’ bourgeois ideology, dialecticising all areas of thought, and developing revolu­ tionary theory, together with a ten-poin t sta tem ent on the relative autonom y of the superstructu re .3 The Philosophical Notes 1929-1941 contain related sections titled ‘O n D ialectics’ and v‘O n in terven ­ tionist th in k in g ’ ( ‘eingreifendes D enken ’) w here, in one group of essays, Brecht considers the agenda for a ‘Society of dialecticians’ — of the kind perhaps which m et in his own apartm en t in the early 1930s, and in ano ther passage titled ‘D ialectics’ dismisses the m echanical and undialectical idea of progress tow ards socialism .4 T he essays on ‘in terventionist th in k in g ’ confirm B recht’s view of dialectics as a m ode of critical thinking, purposefully oriented tow ards practice and social change. In an earlier passage titled ‘C ritical M arx ism ’ he had referred to this as ‘die K unst des praktischen Negierens, . . . die, der Entwicklungsgesetze eingedenk, im H inblick au f eine bestim m te m ögliche Lösung k ritis ie rt.’ ( ‘the art of practical negation . . . which, m indful of the laws of develop­ m ent, criticises with a view to a definite possible so lu tion .’) .5 M arxism ‘lehrt eingreifendes D enken gegenüber der W irk lichkeit’ (‘teaches interventionist thinking towards reality’), says Brecht, and

M arx and L enin, in the in terchangeable set of term s he explores in these essays, were themselves examples of interventionist, critical, dialectical, and ‘correct th in k in g ’.6