ABSTRACT
When Charles Langdell advanced the case method at Harvard Law School in the 19th century, assessment of students’ case analyses was straightforward and uncomplicated. Case analyses, according to Langdell’s philosophy of law, should adhere to precedent. In teacher education, however, it is currently averred that the knowledge base of teaching affords few, if any, precedents (Merseth, 1991). Clark and Lampert (1986) contend that knowledge for teaching is “tentative,” and “transient” rather than static. Harrington (1995) asserts that in teaching there are “alternative solutions rather than ‘correct answers’” (p. 203) and that these solutions are “competing, often equally valid” (p. 204). This new conception of knowledge for teaching is frequently cited as a rationale for casebased instruction aimed at the improvement of reflection, decision making, or problem solving (see, e.g., Merseth, 1991, 1996). Within this new conception of teacher knowledge, however, what makes one decision better than another? How are equally valid solutions to be assessed? Regardless of the nature of teacher
knowledge, democratic teacher preparation requires well explicated, public, and justified evaluation standards.
