ABSTRACT

Disputes over sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS) involve not only the claimants (China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam) but also major maritime powers whose ships regularly move through these waters (the United States, Japan, India, Australia). Among the claimants, China is the most ambitious and ambiguous. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims include all land features in the sea and arguably the entire SCS itself. Two starkly different approaches to the SCS conflict are discussed: (1) diplomacy among the claimants either bilaterally-advocated by China-or multilaterally endorsed by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); or (2) in the event that diplomacy fails, a buildup by claimants of their naval and air capabilities-potentially to assert their rights through force. As the primary naval power in the region insuring freedom of navigation, the United States has an important stake in the peaceful resolution of the SCS disputes. Not only because of Washington’s support of ASEAN multilateral diplomacy but also because of its security commitment to the Philippines (a claimant), the United States could become involved if the dispute becomes an armed conflict. As the United States shifts more military resources to the western Pacific, it is also ramping up its diplomatic support for the SCS littorals whose maritime policies are consonant with Washington’s.