ABSTRACT
Within the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) (IMO, 2002) the Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is also considered as part of the risk assessment step and it is viewed as a process that consists on identification of key tasks, task analysis of key tasks, human error identification, human error analysis and human reliability quantification. Guedes Soares & Teixeira (2001) identified the need of adequate human error probabilities in order to fit into quantified system models such as fault trees, if a fully quantitative analysis is required, within the FSA process. However, due to limitations on the integration of the human factors within risk analysis and due to the unavailability of
1 INTRODUCTION
A detailed analysis of maritime accidents shows that most are caused primarily by human factors, both individual and organizational, with a percentage around 80% (Rothblum et al., 2002; Baker and Seah, 2004; Gemelos and Ventikos, 2007; Antão and Guedes Soares, 2008). The major percentage of these human errors is related to tasks in the ship bridge, as for example failure to perceive incoming vessels, inadequate lookout or simply inadequate communication between crew members. This problem is slowly being recognized by the international regulatory bodies in the marine industry. Recently the International Maritime Organization acknowledged the need for increased focus on human-related activities in the safe operation of ships (IMO, 2004).
