ABSTRACT
In the spring of 2009, Russia ofcially declared an end to their Chechen counterterrorism (CT) operations (Schaefer, 2011, p. 217). At that time, a century’s old conict rooted deep in a shared past had been raging with only sporadic respites for over 15 years. The relative calm that the Russians
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 145 A Divided House: Background ...................................................................................................... 146 Dening Identity ............................................................................................................................ 147 Tip and Run: Insurgency ................................................................................................................ 148 Ideal Conditions: Chechnya ........................................................................................................... 148 The Ideal Breeding Ground: Chaos ............................................................................................... 149 The Last Bastion of Identity: Islam as a Political Force ................................................................ 149 Setting a Dangerous Precedent: Violent Terrorism ........................................................................ 150 A Macabre Respite: Russian Reorganization and a Fledgling Chechnya ...................................... 151 A New Course Is Plotted: Putin’s Russia and a Change in Policy ................................................. 152 A New Framing: The “War on Terror” .......................................................................................... 152 Russian Strategy: Rhetoric and Ideology ....................................................................................... 153 Ensuring Failure ............................................................................................................................. 154 The Surge: A Reorganized Insurgency........................................................................................... 154 Doubling Down: Russian Commitment to Set Policy Course ....................................................... 155 An Alternate View: Russian Counterinsurgency Doctrine ............................................................. 156 Systemic Shortcomings .................................................................................................................. 157 On the Other Side of the Mountains: Georgia ............................................................................... 157 An Inconvenient but Self-Evident Truth: The Growth of an Islamic Insurgency and the North Caucasus Emirate ........................................................................................................... 158 Playing with Fire: Co-Opting Islam ............................................................................................... 159 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 160 Suggested Reading ......................................................................................................................... 161 References ...................................................................................................................................... 162
claimed prevailed in the area had critics in the Western media and within the US state department believing the conict was perhaps nally at an end (Schaefer, 2011, p. 1). At the time of the Russian declaration it is easy to understand why this view would be accepted. Since 2006, there had been a noticeable decline in violence relative to the regional norms. In the months and years since this declaration, however, its emptiness, a standard feature of Russian claims regarding Chechnya, has been laid bare. Once again violence, religious fanaticism, and regional instability are rapidly on the rise.
