Time

Question I am still confused about the different uses of the word ‘time’. How do you distinguish between the ‘time’ that is involved in the classical cause-effect relations (cause coming earlier in time, and effect coming later), the ‘time’ in the definition of determinism in newtonian materialism, the ‘time’ involved in the human consciousness’ becoming aware of duration, and the abstract time of field theory? Can you illustrate with reference to the human society? Reply The roles of space and time in field theory, as abstract, nonobservable parameters, that only serve the subjective purpose of facilitating a description of the world in terms of objective laws of nature, are quite different than the roles of space and time according to the implications of the philosophic view of materialism, that characterizes classical physics4. With the classical view, the separate material things, which are identified according to their locations in space and the times when they are there, are the elementary stuff from which the universe is built. The evolution of the predetermined motions of all material objects then relates to the time development of the universe, with this classical view. On the other hand, the field approach seems to me to give a quite contrary interpretation of matter. For here there are no individual trajectories to be identified with separate material things-even though the view of separability of the classical approach forms a good approximation for the actual picture in field theory, under the appropriate conditions. But in fundamental terms, this view starts with the single closed system, rather than the collection of independent things (atomism). In the field theory, there is only one space and time language to be used in its description. But this language may be expressed in various ways depending on the frame of reference from which it is described. The idea, then, in seeking an understanding of the laws of nature as applied to a closed system, is to compare carefully the different features of the system, as expressed in as many different frames of reference as is imaginable, from the view of any one of them, then seeking the common elements (invariants) in the contents of the respective statements about the world that emerge. With this approach, the oneness of the system is somewhat akin to a single closed surface, like an inflated balloon, rather than a box full of different sorts of cookies. One can move a cookie about in the box, or remove some of them, without altering the basic characteristics of the system that is a box of cookies. But if, for example, a thumb is pushed

into the surface of the balloon, tension is produced throughout the entire surface of the balloon! If one should carry these ideas forward, as an analogue for a description of the human society, and attempt to ascertain which are the fundamental underlying elements-those associated with the atomistic, independent ego model, like the society of cookies in the box, or those similar to the abstract field theory of a closed society, like the surface of an inflated balloon, one would have to rely on the empirical facts about societies to verify or to refute one of these theories of society or the other-if the decision is to be based on a scientific approach to truth. Of course, we have no ‘established knowledge’ at our present stage of knowledge of societies that will eventually be explicable in terms of the concepts of relativistic physics and its implied closed systemwhich would be my choice for a more valid model. Still, some of the experts on the problems of society do have hints from their studies of sociology, psychology and anthropology, that indeed reveal indications that this holistic view of a closed system model of society may turn out to be true after all5. A pertinent question that may be asked by the (perhaps naive) inquirer is the following. Suppose that a new-born human being should be placed in a society of kangaroos, in the outback of Australia. Imagine that the kangaroos should find it possible to accept this infant into their society and to take care of her needs, such as shelter, food, companionship and (a primitive sort of) love. As this baby grows, would she become a human being at maturity? Or would she be more like a kangaroo? The atomistic view must conclude that no matter what sort of environment she grew up in, this person would remain a human being, even though she may not have learned the ways of civilization. That is, the assertion would be that this creature must remain human, strictly based on her genetic make-up. The abstract field theory of the society would imply that at maturity this creature would be more like a kangaroo than a human being. Still, as an element of a closed system, the further implication must follow that the human being and the kangaroo are not totally distinct from each other. Rather, they are different manifestations of a single closed system, which is all of nature. At least, this is my interpretation of the philosophy that underlies the theory of relativity, when it is pursued to its logical extreme. Such a holistic view of nature-assuming that the universe is a system without actual separable parts-is the philosophic stand that was proposed by Spinoza, in the 17th century. Of course, our present understandings of the behaviour of a human being and the problems of society are at a very primitive stage, compared with our

understanding in the physical sciences. These comments on the problem of society should then not be taken as more than speculative and conjectural, though induced by hints from observations of societies. Question In your view, what are the basic differences that distinguish a human being from the other animate and the inanimate manifestations of the closed system that you are proposing as a model of the universe? Reply The main difference, as far as I can see, is the human being’s consciousness. It may be that a rabbit or a carrot, or even a rock, have some sort of consciousness, that is, that they can think in some way. But I do not have any scientific evidence that a rabbit has a consciousness that resembles that of a human in any way, nor that a carrot or a rock have any form of consciousness at all! One of the important consequences of our having a consciousness is the feeling it gives us of duration, which we identify with time. It is this sort of time that I have referred to before as ‘perceptual time’. This should not be confused with ‘physical time’—that is expressed in terms of the language element (i.e. the parameter t) and is used in our equations of motion or in the field equations, to express laws of nature6. Of course, under special circumstances one may correlate these two types of time. Indeed, this is the reason that they are both called by the same name-‘time’. Still, one must keep in mind that these refer to entirely different concepts. The theory of relativity has taught the physicist to make this fundamental distinction. It was also emphasized in classical physics by Newton and in the contemporary period by Henri Bergson7. A second important feature of our consciousness is its ability to simulate an approximate detachment from our environment, and in so doing, acquiring an awareness of ‘other’. This awareness is ‘knowing’. It is important, however, that with this approach of the philosophy of relativity theory, approximate detachment can never mean complete detachment. This is because the human being, as well as all other components of the single closed system-the physical world-are only manifestations of this unified entity; they are not separable parts. The view that I am expressing here is somewhat akin to the type of existentialism propounded by the contemporary philosopher, Martin Buber8. The fully closed system is summarized in his I-Thou relation. The state of approximate detachment is summarized in his I-It relation. The idea of science, then, is to start with the complete universe-the universal existent to be associated with the physical world-and then to deduce observable manifestations of this single system, as derived particulars. In this context, it is important to note that one of the

derived particulars from the underlying reality that is the universe is the human being’s comprehension of it. That is, our understanding of the universe is one of its own manifestations! Since we are only finite beings, we can never become omniscient; we can never acquire a complete understanding of any manifestation of the universe, if such total understanding is infinite in extent9. But this is not to say that it is meaningless to assert a belief in the existence of the one universal that is the universe, with total underlying order. With this philosophy of science, which is Spinozist, it is our function, as scientists and philosophers, to probe continuously the single existent, of which we, ourselves, are basic components, successively approximating closer and closer to the ‘truth’ of this reality. But this is indeed an infinite number of steps, some forward and some (hopefully less) backward. I believe that it is through this sort of intellectual activity that the human being transcends the crude materialism of naive realism, that our egos wish us to accept. Instead, we progress in such transcendence toward a more complete and realistic understanding of the world-a realism that is ‘abstract’ for the simple reason that our apparatuses to perceive and to measure are not the type that would directly respond to the objective truths of nature. But we have been given the capacity to think rationally. With this, I believe that we can capture at least a glimpse of the real world. At least, this is the view that I see taken by the philosophic stand of realism that underlies a full exploitation of the theory of relativity. Some, who take the philosophic stand of logical positivism, deny that it is meaningful to talk about such ‘underlying truths’. All that they would concede to exist are the logical relations between the numbers on the meters of our measuring instruments, that the human being is using to measure effects related to particular physical phenomena10. I do not believe that this is a valid view because it denies that we can attain any fundamental understanding of the world. It claims that all we can do is to describe it, but that we cannot explain it! I believe that this assertion is refuted by the history of science, which teaches that indeed we have attained some fundamental comprehension of the real worldmeagre as it has been since the Stone Age, compared with all that there is to understand! This is exemplified in humankind’s continual progress in the programme of philosophy and science, in gaining further understanding of the real world by means of rational and methodical comparisons of the hints received by our perceptive and instrumental probing devices and the logical implications of our hypotheses in physics.