ABSTRACT
M idas (1981) stated that the key to actual productivity im provem ent is understanding the elements that can bring about productivity growth. One o f these is the im portant leverage quality strategy can have in productivity improvement. Danforth (1984) pointed out that too m any people think that high quality always costs more: this is wrong. Producing more-ineffi ciently-at the expense o f quality is no way to increase productivity. Putting m ore inspectors on the line to find m istakes is the wrong approach. Doing som ething over again that was not done right the first time decreases efficiency, wastes m oney, and lowers productivity. Feigenbaum (1979) estim ated that poor quality can represent about 15-40% o f the p lan t’s productive capacity. Cole (1981) estim ated the im pact o f im plem enting the “find and fix” philosophy in the automobile industry by stating: “An
estim ated one out o f every ten workers in automobile assembly plants in the U nited States is engaged in repairing substandard items, resulting in truly staggering costs for scrap, rework, retest, downtim e, yield losses, and disposal o f substandard com ponents.” Cole further explained that another inefficiency that results from this philosophy is that it increases the num ber o f inspectors required to detect defects. The author defined inspection as an operation that adds to the cost o f a product. H e estim ated a typical ratio o f one inspector to twenty operators in U.S. factories and one inspector to thirty operators in Japan. Cole pointed out that inspection detracts from productivity and that reliance on inspectors causes employees to be less concerned about quality, which in turn leads management to hire even more inspectors. Indeed, problems are passed on to the dealer, who receives larger dealer preparation fees to make adjustments and corrections. The consumer often receives a costlier product of poor quality. This cycle reveals the disadvantages o f separating quality assurance from its execution.
