ABSTRACT
One possible solution is to give the intangible a notional situs and then treat it as if it were a physical object. Quite apart from the metaphysics of attributing a location to something which has no corporeal existence, the attribution of a situs to an intangible, while it may have some utility in the case of involuntary assignments,111 misses the point about the essential difference between a physical object, or a right over one, and an interest in an intangible. For a physical object has an existence independent of the judicial relations which legal systems may recognise with regard to it – it can be lost, found, accidentally destroyed, etc – whereas an intangible interest only exists in the milieu of juridical relations: it cannot have an independent existence outside of them. The interest in an intangible is one which represents an existing set of relations – a debt owed by A to B, A’s shares in B’s company, A’s patent or copyright.
