The case of Mr Holt was different from the two cases just discussed in a number of respects. It aroused considerable interest amongst safety practitioners, but does not appear to have been reported, or even noted, except in the Health and Safety Information Bulletin. The facts were that Norman Holt, a director of a Lancashire firm, David Holt Plastics Ltd, was charged with manslaughter following the death of an employee at the company’s factory. The death occurred as a result of the employee coming into contact with the blade of an unguarded machine which was used for breaking up plastic. The case came before Preston Crown Court; the director pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. The case was unique for two reasons: firstly, it was the first time that a company director had been charged and convicted under the common law of manslaughter following the death of an employee; secondly, there had been a number of breaches of both the Factories Act 1961 and the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and proceedings were also brought in relation to these. Normally, the rule that inspectors appointed to enforce the Health and Safety at Work Act have the sole right to prosecute for offences committed under that Act prevents the prosecution of workplace offences through the Crown Prosecution Service and that, in turn, prevents consideration of whether it is appropriate to bring prosecutions within the broader spectrum of the general criminal law. For their part, health and safety inspectors are empowered only to prosecute for breaches of the duties imposed by the relevant legislation. In Mr Holt’s case, the prosecution followed the inquest into the employee’s death; the coroner referred the matter to the Crown Prosecution Service. The report suggests that the Director of Public Prosecutions then exercised the power given to him by s 38 of the Health and Safety at Work Act to permit the CPS to prosecute for the statutory offences as well as for manslaughter. The final case for consideration under this section is that of Mr Holloway, an electrician who caused the death of a householder; his case came before the Court of Appeal, together with several other cases (concerning medical malpractice) raising the same issue as to the legal basis of involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty. The case is usually referred to as R v Prentice. REGINA v HOLLOWAY [1993] 3 WLR 927 Before dealing with individual appeals, Lord Taylor of Gosforth remarked that all the cases were concerned with the true legal basis of involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty and proceeded to consider the precedents for guidance as to the ingredients of the offence. The extracts cited from his judgment begin at p 932:

DOI link for The case of Mr Holt was different from the two cases just discussed in a number of respects. It aroused considerable interest amongst safety practitioners, but does not appear to have been reported, or even noted, except in the Health and Safety Information Bulletin. The facts were that Norman Holt, a director of a Lancashire firm, David Holt Plastics Ltd, was charged with manslaughter following the death of an employee at the company’s factory. The death occurred as a result of the employee coming into contact with the blade of an unguarded machine which was used for breaking up plastic. The case came before Preston Crown Court; the director pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. The case was unique for two reasons: firstly, it was the first time that a company director had been charged and convicted under the common law of manslaughter following the death of an employee; secondly, there had been a number of breaches of both the Factories Act 1961 and the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and proceedings were also brought in relation to these. Normally, the rule that inspectors appointed to enforce the Health and Safety at Work Act have the sole right to prosecute for offences committed under that Act prevents the prosecution of workplace offences through the Crown Prosecution Service and that, in turn, prevents consideration of whether it is appropriate to bring prosecutions within the broader spectrum of the general criminal law. For their part, health and safety inspectors are empowered only to prosecute for breaches of the duties imposed by the relevant legislation. In Mr Holt’s case, the prosecution followed the inquest into the employee’s death; the coroner referred the matter to the Crown Prosecution Service. The report suggests that the Director of Public Prosecutions then exercised the power given to him by s 38 of the Health and Safety at Work Act to permit the CPS to prosecute for the statutory offences as well as for manslaughter. The final case for consideration under this section is that of Mr Holloway, an electrician who caused the death of a householder; his case came before the Court of Appeal, together with several other cases (concerning medical malpractice) raising the same issue as to the legal basis of involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty. The case is usually referred to as R v Prentice. REGINA v HOLLOWAY [1993] 3 WLR 927 Before dealing with individual appeals, Lord Taylor of Gosforth remarked that all the cases were concerned with the true legal basis of involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty and proceeded to consider the precedents for guidance as to the ingredients of the offence. The extracts cited from his judgment begin at p 932:

The case of Mr Holt was different from the two cases just discussed in a number of respects. It aroused considerable interest amongst safety practitioners, but does not appear to have been reported, or even noted, except in the Health and Safety Information Bulletin. The facts were that Norman Holt, a director of a Lancashire firm, David Holt Plastics Ltd, was charged with manslaughter following the death of an employee at the company’s factory. The death occurred as a result of the employee coming into contact with the blade of an unguarded machine which was used for breaking up plastic. The case came before Preston Crown Court; the director pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. The case was unique for two reasons: firstly, it was the first time that a company director had been charged and convicted under the common law of manslaughter following the death of an employee; secondly, there had been a number of breaches of both the Factories Act 1961 and the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and proceedings were also brought in relation to these. Normally, the rule that inspectors appointed to enforce the Health and Safety at Work Act have the sole right to prosecute for offences committed under that Act prevents the prosecution of workplace offences through the Crown Prosecution Service and that, in turn, prevents consideration of whether it is appropriate to bring prosecutions within the broader spectrum of the general criminal law. For their part, health and safety inspectors are empowered only to prosecute for breaches of the duties imposed by the relevant legislation. In Mr Holt’s case, the prosecution followed the inquest into the employee’s death; the coroner referred the matter to the Crown Prosecution Service. The report suggests that the Director of Public Prosecutions then exercised the power given to him by s 38 of the Health and Safety at Work Act to permit the CPS to prosecute for the statutory offences as well as for manslaughter. The final case for consideration under this section is that of Mr Holloway, an electrician who caused the death of a householder; his case came before the Court of Appeal, together with several other cases (concerning medical malpractice) raising the same issue as to the legal basis of involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty. The case is usually referred to as R v Prentice. REGINA v HOLLOWAY [1993] 3 WLR 927 Before dealing with individual appeals, Lord Taylor of Gosforth remarked that all the cases were concerned with the true legal basis of involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty and proceeded to consider the precedents for guidance as to the ingredients of the offence. The extracts cited from his judgment begin at p 932: