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committing offences against them. As Laws J observed: ‘The reasons for the presumption, however they may have been articulated in the old cases, cannot begin to justify its application in a case where the boy is not the perpetrator of the offence, but its victim. Accordingly, the appellant in the present case would rightly have been found guilty of inciting the mother to have intercourse with her son, even if it were plain beyond argument that he was under 14 at the time ...’ 2 In DPP v Armstrong (above), A had contended that the offence he had incited was impossible to carry out as the incitee (unknown to A at the relevant time) was an undercover police office who would never have supplied the pornography requested by A. This argument was rejected by the Divisional Court on the basis that the incitee could have had access to and supplied the material if he had wanted to. J could have supplied the material had he so wished. 3 As part of the government’s response to concerns over ‘sexual tourism’ – principally the sexual exploitation of children in countries overseas facilitated by individuals in the United Kingdom – Parliament enacted the Sexual Offences (Conspiracy And Incitement) Act 1996. Section 2 of the Act applies where:
DOI link for committing offences against them. As Laws J observed: ‘The reasons for the presumption, however they may have been articulated in the old cases, cannot begin to justify its application in a case where the boy is not the perpetrator of the offence, but its victim. Accordingly, the appellant in the present case would rightly have been found guilty of inciting the mother to have intercourse with her son, even if it were plain beyond argument that he was under 14 at the time ...’ 2 In DPP v Armstrong (above), A had contended that the offence he had incited was impossible to carry out as the incitee (unknown to A at the relevant time) was an undercover police office who would never have supplied the pornography requested by A. This argument was rejected by the Divisional Court on the basis that the incitee could have had access to and supplied the material if he had wanted to. J could have supplied the material had he so wished. 3 As part of the government’s response to concerns over ‘sexual tourism’ – principally the sexual exploitation of children in countries overseas facilitated by individuals in the United Kingdom – Parliament enacted the Sexual Offences (Conspiracy And Incitement) Act 1996. Section 2 of the Act applies where:
committing offences against them. As Laws J observed: ‘The reasons for the presumption, however they may have been articulated in the old cases, cannot begin to justify its application in a case where the boy is not the perpetrator of the offence, but its victim. Accordingly, the appellant in the present case would rightly have been found guilty of inciting the mother to have intercourse with her son, even if it were plain beyond argument that he was under 14 at the time ...’ 2 In DPP v Armstrong (above), A had contended that the offence he had incited was impossible to carry out as the incitee (unknown to A at the relevant time) was an undercover police office who would never have supplied the pornography requested by A. This argument was rejected by the Divisional Court on the basis that the incitee could have had access to and supplied the material if he had wanted to. J could have supplied the material had he so wished. 3 As part of the government’s response to concerns over ‘sexual tourism’ – principally the sexual exploitation of children in countries overseas facilitated by individuals in the United Kingdom – Parliament enacted the Sexual Offences (Conspiracy And Incitement) Act 1996. Section 2 of the Act applies where:
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