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psychiatric illness. In refusing to admit the evidence the judge considered Graham and Howe and said that if the word ‘characteristics’ was given the natural wide meaning it would include personal mental characteristics and if these were included the objective test would be undermined completely. Therefore, there must be a limited meaning in this context and it seemed to the judge it would include such things as age, sex, and serious physical disability, but he did not consider it included mental characteristics such as inherent weakness, vulnerability and susceptibility to threats. The history was inadmissible as hearsay and the doctor could not say whether the appellant was in fact threatened nor could he say whether he was affected by any threats which might have been made. The psychiatrist’s opinion that the appellant was by nature pliable or vulnerable could not concern the jury because that would circumvent the objective test. The death of his father a year or more before the offences was something within the ordinary scope of human experience (see Turner (1974) 60 Cr App R 80). In support of his argument that the judge was wrong, counsel relied on a passage from the Law Commission Report (No 83, para 228), which said that the personal characteristics of a defendant were most important. Threats directed against a weak, immature or disabled person might well be much more compelling than against a normal healthy person. However, that recommendation was not enacted by Parliament and did not represent the law. The court was bound by Graham and Howe, and Lord Lane’s judgment in Graham did not comply with the suggestion of the Law Commission. The second limb of the test, which passed an objective test, required the jury to ask themselves whether a person of reasonable firmness, otherwise sharing the characteristics of the defendant, would or might have responded as he did to the threats to which he was subjected. If the standard for comparison was a person of reasonable firmness it must be irrelevant for the jury to consider any characteristics of the defendant which showed that he was not such a person, but was pliant or vulnerable to pressure. It would be a contradiction in terms to ask the jury this question, and then to ask them to take into account, as one of his characteristics, that he was pliant or vulnerable. For the purposes of this appeal, evidence of personal vulnerability or pliancy falling short of psychiatric illness was not relevant. R v Hegarty [1994] Crim LR 353 (CA) Facts: At the appellant’s trial for robbery, and possession of an imitation weapon, his defence was duress. He claimed that some Asian men who accommodated him when he was on the run later attacked him and threatened violence against his family unless he carried out the robberies. The Crown challenged the existence of the Asians or the threats. In support of the plea of duress the appellant sought to put before the court the evidence of two medical witnesses who would testify to his mental instability. He had a conviction for manslaughter of his wife on grounds of diminished responsibility, and the
DOI link for psychiatric illness. In refusing to admit the evidence the judge considered Graham and Howe and said that if the word ‘characteristics’ was given the natural wide meaning it would include personal mental characteristics and if these were included the objective test would be undermined completely. Therefore, there must be a limited meaning in this context and it seemed to the judge it would include such things as age, sex, and serious physical disability, but he did not consider it included mental characteristics such as inherent weakness, vulnerability and susceptibility to threats. The history was inadmissible as hearsay and the doctor could not say whether the appellant was in fact threatened nor could he say whether he was affected by any threats which might have been made. The psychiatrist’s opinion that the appellant was by nature pliable or vulnerable could not concern the jury because that would circumvent the objective test. The death of his father a year or more before the offences was something within the ordinary scope of human experience (see Turner (1974) 60 Cr App R 80). In support of his argument that the judge was wrong, counsel relied on a passage from the Law Commission Report (No 83, para 228), which said that the personal characteristics of a defendant were most important. Threats directed against a weak, immature or disabled person might well be much more compelling than against a normal healthy person. However, that recommendation was not enacted by Parliament and did not represent the law. The court was bound by Graham and Howe, and Lord Lane’s judgment in Graham did not comply with the suggestion of the Law Commission. The second limb of the test, which passed an objective test, required the jury to ask themselves whether a person of reasonable firmness, otherwise sharing the characteristics of the defendant, would or might have responded as he did to the threats to which he was subjected. If the standard for comparison was a person of reasonable firmness it must be irrelevant for the jury to consider any characteristics of the defendant which showed that he was not such a person, but was pliant or vulnerable to pressure. It would be a contradiction in terms to ask the jury this question, and then to ask them to take into account, as one of his characteristics, that he was pliant or vulnerable. For the purposes of this appeal, evidence of personal vulnerability or pliancy falling short of psychiatric illness was not relevant. R v Hegarty [1994] Crim LR 353 (CA) Facts: At the appellant’s trial for robbery, and possession of an imitation weapon, his defence was duress. He claimed that some Asian men who accommodated him when he was on the run later attacked him and threatened violence against his family unless he carried out the robberies. The Crown challenged the existence of the Asians or the threats. In support of the plea of duress the appellant sought to put before the court the evidence of two medical witnesses who would testify to his mental instability. He had a conviction for manslaughter of his wife on grounds of diminished responsibility, and the
psychiatric illness. In refusing to admit the evidence the judge considered Graham and Howe and said that if the word ‘characteristics’ was given the natural wide meaning it would include personal mental characteristics and if these were included the objective test would be undermined completely. Therefore, there must be a limited meaning in this context and it seemed to the judge it would include such things as age, sex, and serious physical disability, but he did not consider it included mental characteristics such as inherent weakness, vulnerability and susceptibility to threats. The history was inadmissible as hearsay and the doctor could not say whether the appellant was in fact threatened nor could he say whether he was affected by any threats which might have been made. The psychiatrist’s opinion that the appellant was by nature pliable or vulnerable could not concern the jury because that would circumvent the objective test. The death of his father a year or more before the offences was something within the ordinary scope of human experience (see Turner (1974) 60 Cr App R 80). In support of his argument that the judge was wrong, counsel relied on a passage from the Law Commission Report (No 83, para 228), which said that the personal characteristics of a defendant were most important. Threats directed against a weak, immature or disabled person might well be much more compelling than against a normal healthy person. However, that recommendation was not enacted by Parliament and did not represent the law. The court was bound by Graham and Howe, and Lord Lane’s judgment in Graham did not comply with the suggestion of the Law Commission. The second limb of the test, which passed an objective test, required the jury to ask themselves whether a person of reasonable firmness, otherwise sharing the characteristics of the defendant, would or might have responded as he did to the threats to which he was subjected. If the standard for comparison was a person of reasonable firmness it must be irrelevant for the jury to consider any characteristics of the defendant which showed that he was not such a person, but was pliant or vulnerable to pressure. It would be a contradiction in terms to ask the jury this question, and then to ask them to take into account, as one of his characteristics, that he was pliant or vulnerable. For the purposes of this appeal, evidence of personal vulnerability or pliancy falling short of psychiatric illness was not relevant. R v Hegarty [1994] Crim LR 353 (CA) Facts: At the appellant’s trial for robbery, and possession of an imitation weapon, his defence was duress. He claimed that some Asian men who accommodated him when he was on the run later attacked him and threatened violence against his family unless he carried out the robberies. The Crown challenged the existence of the Asians or the threats. In support of the plea of duress the appellant sought to put before the court the evidence of two medical witnesses who would testify to his mental instability. He had a conviction for manslaughter of his wife on grounds of diminished responsibility, and the
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