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reversing he accidentally drove over one of his own passengers who had failed to get into the car in time. The magistrates’ court convicted him of driving with excess alcohol but the Crown Court allowed his appeal against conviction on the basis of duress. The prosecutor appealed against the Crown Court decision by way of case stated. Held, dismissing the appeal, it was clear that the defence of duress was made out where fear engendered by threats caused a person to lose complete control of his will (see Willer (1986) 83 Cr App R 225; Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173, 176, per Farquharson J). On the facts found by the Crown Court the appellant was in terror when he drove off and it was a hypothetical question whether he might have driven in the same way if he had not been in fear from the threats. A further important finding of fact was that he drove off only ‘some distance’ down the road and not, for example, all the way home so that the defence of duress/necessity continued to avail him. (DPP v Jones [1990] RTR 33 distinguished.) The prosecution had failed to negative the defence of duress. DPP v Davis; DPP v Pittaway [1994] Crim LR 600 (DC) Facts: The respondents were charged separately with driving with excess alcohol, contrary to s5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Magistrates dismissed the charges finding that, in each case, the defence of duress had been proved. The DPP appealed by way of case stated. Davis: Magistrates found Davis had been suffering stress and anxiety when he had accepted an invitation to go for a meal with a male acquaintance. After the meal he returned to the other man’s flat where he became the subject of an unwelcome homosexual advance. Magistrates found he feared for his life and had run from the flat. After breaking free from the other man’s clutches, he had driven away. Magistrates applied a subjective test in deciding it was more likely than not that events had caused Davis to lose complete control of his will. Pittaway: Pittaway had recently divorced her husband who had been violent towards her. Magistrates found that, as a result of the violence she was frightened of men. She formed a new relationship with the appellant. At a party, she and the appellant had a row, leading to an angry exchange of words outside the party and unspecified threats being made by the appellant. Magistrates found the respondent believed she would suffer immediate violence from the appellant and, although she ran to her house which was about 200 yards from the party, she decided instead to hide in her car. After five minutes or so, she drove 200 yards before being stopped. The appellant was not in the vicinity at the time. Held, allowing both appeals and remitting the cases to the magistrates with a direction to convict, there was not evidence raising the defence of duress. Davis: Although the defence of duress was subjective, it also had objective elements to it, namely whether there was good cause to fear death or serious injury would occur unless the respondent acted as he had done, and whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the respondent’s characteristics,
DOI link for reversing he accidentally drove over one of his own passengers who had failed to get into the car in time. The magistrates’ court convicted him of driving with excess alcohol but the Crown Court allowed his appeal against conviction on the basis of duress. The prosecutor appealed against the Crown Court decision by way of case stated. Held, dismissing the appeal, it was clear that the defence of duress was made out where fear engendered by threats caused a person to lose complete control of his will (see Willer (1986) 83 Cr App R 225; Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173, 176, per Farquharson J). On the facts found by the Crown Court the appellant was in terror when he drove off and it was a hypothetical question whether he might have driven in the same way if he had not been in fear from the threats. A further important finding of fact was that he drove off only ‘some distance’ down the road and not, for example, all the way home so that the defence of duress/necessity continued to avail him. (DPP v Jones [1990] RTR 33 distinguished.) The prosecution had failed to negative the defence of duress. DPP v Davis; DPP v Pittaway [1994] Crim LR 600 (DC) Facts: The respondents were charged separately with driving with excess alcohol, contrary to s5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Magistrates dismissed the charges finding that, in each case, the defence of duress had been proved. The DPP appealed by way of case stated. Davis: Magistrates found Davis had been suffering stress and anxiety when he had accepted an invitation to go for a meal with a male acquaintance. After the meal he returned to the other man’s flat where he became the subject of an unwelcome homosexual advance. Magistrates found he feared for his life and had run from the flat. After breaking free from the other man’s clutches, he had driven away. Magistrates applied a subjective test in deciding it was more likely than not that events had caused Davis to lose complete control of his will. Pittaway: Pittaway had recently divorced her husband who had been violent towards her. Magistrates found that, as a result of the violence she was frightened of men. She formed a new relationship with the appellant. At a party, she and the appellant had a row, leading to an angry exchange of words outside the party and unspecified threats being made by the appellant. Magistrates found the respondent believed she would suffer immediate violence from the appellant and, although she ran to her house which was about 200 yards from the party, she decided instead to hide in her car. After five minutes or so, she drove 200 yards before being stopped. The appellant was not in the vicinity at the time. Held, allowing both appeals and remitting the cases to the magistrates with a direction to convict, there was not evidence raising the defence of duress. Davis: Although the defence of duress was subjective, it also had objective elements to it, namely whether there was good cause to fear death or serious injury would occur unless the respondent acted as he had done, and whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the respondent’s characteristics,
reversing he accidentally drove over one of his own passengers who had failed to get into the car in time. The magistrates’ court convicted him of driving with excess alcohol but the Crown Court allowed his appeal against conviction on the basis of duress. The prosecutor appealed against the Crown Court decision by way of case stated. Held, dismissing the appeal, it was clear that the defence of duress was made out where fear engendered by threats caused a person to lose complete control of his will (see Willer (1986) 83 Cr App R 225; Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173, 176, per Farquharson J). On the facts found by the Crown Court the appellant was in terror when he drove off and it was a hypothetical question whether he might have driven in the same way if he had not been in fear from the threats. A further important finding of fact was that he drove off only ‘some distance’ down the road and not, for example, all the way home so that the defence of duress/necessity continued to avail him. (DPP v Jones [1990] RTR 33 distinguished.) The prosecution had failed to negative the defence of duress. DPP v Davis; DPP v Pittaway [1994] Crim LR 600 (DC) Facts: The respondents were charged separately with driving with excess alcohol, contrary to s5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Magistrates dismissed the charges finding that, in each case, the defence of duress had been proved. The DPP appealed by way of case stated. Davis: Magistrates found Davis had been suffering stress and anxiety when he had accepted an invitation to go for a meal with a male acquaintance. After the meal he returned to the other man’s flat where he became the subject of an unwelcome homosexual advance. Magistrates found he feared for his life and had run from the flat. After breaking free from the other man’s clutches, he had driven away. Magistrates applied a subjective test in deciding it was more likely than not that events had caused Davis to lose complete control of his will. Pittaway: Pittaway had recently divorced her husband who had been violent towards her. Magistrates found that, as a result of the violence she was frightened of men. She formed a new relationship with the appellant. At a party, she and the appellant had a row, leading to an angry exchange of words outside the party and unspecified threats being made by the appellant. Magistrates found the respondent believed she would suffer immediate violence from the appellant and, although she ran to her house which was about 200 yards from the party, she decided instead to hide in her car. After five minutes or so, she drove 200 yards before being stopped. The appellant was not in the vicinity at the time. Held, allowing both appeals and remitting the cases to the magistrates with a direction to convict, there was not evidence raising the defence of duress. Davis: Although the defence of duress was subjective, it also had objective elements to it, namely whether there was good cause to fear death or serious injury would occur unless the respondent acted as he had done, and whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the respondent’s characteristics,
ABSTRACT
reversing he accidentally drove over one of his own passengers who had failed to get into the car in time. The magistrates’ court convicted him of driving with excess alcohol but the Crown Court allowed his appeal against conviction on the basis of duress. The prosecutor appealed against the Crown Court decision by way of case stated.
