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his actions and the death because the deceased had committed suicide either by reopening his wounds or, the wounds having reopened themselves, by failing to take steps to staunch the consequent blood flow. It was argued on the appeal that the suicide of the deceased would have been a novus actus interveniens and that the judge had misdirected the jury on the issue of causation. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the real question in the case was, as the judge had correctly directed the jury, whether the injuries inflicted by the appellant were an operating and significant cause of the death. That had been enunciated as the correct approach in Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; Malcherek [1981] 1 WLR 690; Cheshire (1991) 93 Cr App R 251, and Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th edn. It would not be helpful to juries if the law required them to decide causation in a case such as the present by embarking on an analysis of whether a victim had treated himself with mere negligence or gross neglect, the latter breaking but former not breaking the chain of causation between the defendant’s wrongful act and the victim’s death. It would be a retrograde step if the niceties of apportionment of fault and causation in the civil law, and the roles which the concepts of novus actus interveniens and foreseeability did or should play in causation, were to invade the criminal law. In the present case the cause of the deceased’s death was bleeding from the artery which the defendant had severed. Whether or not the resumption or continuation of that bleeding was deliberately caused by the deceased, the jury were entitled to find that the appellant’s conduct made an operative and significant contribution to the death. A positive supervening voluntary act by the victim
DOI link for his actions and the death because the deceased had committed suicide either by reopening his wounds or, the wounds having reopened themselves, by failing to take steps to staunch the consequent blood flow. It was argued on the appeal that the suicide of the deceased would have been a novus actus interveniens and that the judge had misdirected the jury on the issue of causation. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the real question in the case was, as the judge had correctly directed the jury, whether the injuries inflicted by the appellant were an operating and significant cause of the death. That had been enunciated as the correct approach in Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; Malcherek [1981] 1 WLR 690; Cheshire (1991) 93 Cr App R 251, and Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th edn. It would not be helpful to juries if the law required them to decide causation in a case such as the present by embarking on an analysis of whether a victim had treated himself with mere negligence or gross neglect, the latter breaking but former not breaking the chain of causation between the defendant’s wrongful act and the victim’s death. It would be a retrograde step if the niceties of apportionment of fault and causation in the civil law, and the roles which the concepts of novus actus interveniens and foreseeability did or should play in causation, were to invade the criminal law. In the present case the cause of the deceased’s death was bleeding from the artery which the defendant had severed. Whether or not the resumption or continuation of that bleeding was deliberately caused by the deceased, the jury were entitled to find that the appellant’s conduct made an operative and significant contribution to the death. A positive supervening voluntary act by the victim
his actions and the death because the deceased had committed suicide either by reopening his wounds or, the wounds having reopened themselves, by failing to take steps to staunch the consequent blood flow. It was argued on the appeal that the suicide of the deceased would have been a novus actus interveniens and that the judge had misdirected the jury on the issue of causation. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the real question in the case was, as the judge had correctly directed the jury, whether the injuries inflicted by the appellant were an operating and significant cause of the death. That had been enunciated as the correct approach in Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; Malcherek [1981] 1 WLR 690; Cheshire (1991) 93 Cr App R 251, and Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th edn. It would not be helpful to juries if the law required them to decide causation in a case such as the present by embarking on an analysis of whether a victim had treated himself with mere negligence or gross neglect, the latter breaking but former not breaking the chain of causation between the defendant’s wrongful act and the victim’s death. It would be a retrograde step if the niceties of apportionment of fault and causation in the civil law, and the roles which the concepts of novus actus interveniens and foreseeability did or should play in causation, were to invade the criminal law. In the present case the cause of the deceased’s death was bleeding from the artery which the defendant had severed. Whether or not the resumption or continuation of that bleeding was deliberately caused by the deceased, the jury were entitled to find that the appellant’s conduct made an operative and significant contribution to the death. A positive supervening voluntary act by the victim
ABSTRACT
his actions and the death because the deceased had committed suicide either by reopening his wounds or, the wounds having reopened themselves, by failing to take steps to staunch the consequent blood flow. It was argued on the appeal that the suicide of the deceased would have been a novus actus interveniens and that the judge had misdirected the jury on the issue of causation.