ABSTRACT
On 12th December 1988, the 7.18am commuter train from Basingstoke to Waterloo approached Clapham Junction when a signal turned to red just as the train was passing it. The driver had no radio, so, following British Rail rules, he stopped the train, and used a signal box to phone in a report that he had passed a signal at danger (SAD). He expected the signal to stay at red whilst his train was stopped. However, the signal reverted to yellow. A commuter train from Poole then crashed into the back of the Basingstoke train, and as a result, was derailed and forced into the path of a train without passengers, travelling in the opposite direction. Thirty-five people died and 500 were injured, 69 of them seriously (Cook, 1989; James, 1990). Within 12 hours, British Rail accepted full responsibility for the disaster, which was, apparently, due to signal failure. Paul Channon, the Transport Minister promised, in the House of Commons, a full Public Inquiry. A week after the disaster the findings of an internal British Rail were leaked criticising serious overwork, understaffing, flickering signals at Clapham, inadequate inspections and working conditions, and a new system of signalling (Cook, 1989). Anthony Hidden QC was invited to conduct a ‘formal Investigation into the accident under s 7 of the Regulations of Railways Act 1871’ (Hidden, 1988; James, 1990).
