ABSTRACT
To begin with, the subject of restitution is itself fragmented. The old actions for quantum meruit, money had and received, money paid for a consideration that totally fails, and account of profits, for instance, all constitute pecuniary relief for unjust enrichment; but, at least as yet, they have not been regarded as anything other than separate remedies. And the same goes for proprietary relief. Rescission, constructive trusts and equitable liens all potentially provide restitutionary relief in some shape or other; but they do so in different ways and subject to different rules. Unification of the remedies available, and the application, where possible, of common rules applicable to all, would clearly add a great deal to the consistency of the law, and indeed ought to be one object of a consistent theory of restitution. But this stage is a long way off, and for the moment the different forms of action must continue to be treated separately.
