ABSTRACT
Under A 26, normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which were available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The Government had not shown that the Audit Court would have considered giving the applicant’s case priority had he made such a request. It followed that the Court could not find that such a remedy would have been effective. The preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies was accordingly dismissed. Although the applicant’s claim before the domestic court was based on the allegation that his condition was caused by torture suffered between 1967 and 1974, the Court only had to examine the complaint relating to the length of the judicial proceedings brought by the applicant with a view to securing a pension. Greece accepted the right of individual petition on 20 November 1985. The proceedings in issue were brought after that date. The objection of lack of competence ratione temporis was therefore dismissed. The right to a pension was a civil right and A 6(1) was accordingly applicable. The period to be taken into consideration began on 14 June 1988, the date on which the applicant lodged an appeal with the Audit Court. It had not yet ended as no final judgment had so far been delivered. It amounted to some nine and a half years thus far. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings had to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, it was also necessary to take account of what was at stake for the applicant in the litigation. The case was not especially complex. The applicant could not be held responsible for the length of the proceedings. There had been delays on the part of the authorities for which the workload of the plenary Audit Court did not provide a justification, Contracting Parties being under an obligation to ensure that their judicial authorities complied with the requirements of A 6. Bearing in mind the overall length of time taken by the proceedings, namely nine and a half years already, and the importance of what was at stake for the applicant, namely his entitlement to a disability pension and thus a significant portion of his livelihood, the length of proceedings went beyond what could be considered reasonable under A 6(1). There had accordingly been a violation of that provision. It was not necessary to examine the present case under A 13 in addition to A 6.
