ABSTRACT

This chapter does not attempt a description of the everyday workings of the institutions that make up the central executive, for that would amount to a description of a system of government, rather than an analysis of the constitution. Insofar as a distinction can be maintained,1 a work on the constitution should be looking for a normative framework within which government is supposed to be carried on; simply describing the practice of government per se is not therefore the aim. What we are looking for, then, are informing and pervasive ideas and conventions which purport to regulate government activity according to an idea of constitutionalism.2 Since the core of the notion of constitutionalism are the ideas of limited government, checks on government power, and the accountability of government, these themes determine the topics considered here. Attention will focus therefore on two main themes: first, the increased concentration of power into a few hands within government, and, secondly, a cluster of concepts about responsibility and accountability-the responsibility of ministers for their departments, their responsibility to be open with Parliament and not to mislead it, and the responsibilities of civil servants to ministers and possibly to Parliament. The impact on traditional notions of accountability of the ‘Next Steps’ reforms will be considered in depth. The whole topic of accountability will be informed by the evidence thrown up by the Scott Inquiry and its conclusions and by developments in ministerial responsibility under the Blair government.