ABSTRACT
This seemingly all-encompassing definition is subject to both common law and statutory exceptions. The following do not constitute property:
 information (Oxford v Moss (1979)); electricity (Low v Blease (1975)); a human corpse (R v Sharpe (1857)); land (s 4(2)); wild plants (s 4(3)); wild animals (s 4(4)). However, there are also some exceptions to the exceptions, rendering some of the above capable of being stolen in certain circumstances:
 a human corpse does become property capable of being stolen if skill or effort has been exercised on it (Doodeward v Spence (1907)); moreover, products of the body, such as blood and urine are capable of being stolen (R v Rothery (1976); R v Welsh (1974)). In R v
Relevant sections of Theft Act 1968
Kelly (1998), the Court of Appeal held that human body parts are capable of being the subject of a charge of theft if they have acquired different attributes by virtue of the application of skill, such as dissection or preservation techniques;
 land can be appropriated by (a) a trustee, personal representative or liquidator; (b) someone not in possession can appropriate anything severed from the land; and (c) a tenant can appropriate any fixture (s 4(2)(a), (b) and (c));
 wild plants can be stolen if the whole plant is taken or the plant is taken for sale or reward (s 4(3));
 wild animals can be stolen if they are tamed or ordinarily kept in captivity or have been, or are in the process of being, reduced into another’s possession (s 4(4)).
