ABSTRACT
Moreover, as we will discuss, the societal and policy contexts within which nanotechnology is emerging are very different from those in place during the early years of the pesticides revolution. Such differences matter to current discourse over and prospects
for aligning existing regulatory policy to the particular challenges raised by new technologies. This paper therefore looks first at lessons obtained from the policy trajectory of the post-World War II generation of chemical pesticides for the development of a suitably nuanced nanotechnology EHS governance regime. It then ponders the “problem” of nanotechnology and considers prospects for reformulating the U.S. regulatory system in response. While my primary focus is on the United States, the insights derived here are relevant to other political systems. In particular, I argue that nanotechnology is emerging within an established environmental regulatory framework created decades previous, in response to earlier generations of chemical technologies. That ancien régime [3] of decades-old statutes, longstanding bureaucratic rules and routines, narrowly configured judicial decisions, and embedded institutional norms endures, despite its purported inadequacies [4], because relevant political actors are unable, even unwilling, to make changes in the absence of a perceived crisis. As a result, the continued embrace of that regulatory ancien régime on current policy discourse will powerfully shape how we define and address the relative benefits and risks of a new generation of nanomaterials and applications. 26.2 The Pesticides RevolutionThe technological breakthrough in chemical control of pests after World War II burst onto the agricultural scene without a professional technocracy to guide and control its use. Literally over-night, some of the most toxic and ecologically disruptive chemicals known to science were placed in the hands of farmers, agribusiness salesmen, and federal farm advisors almost totally unaware of their genetic and ecological implications [5]. The iconic postwar chemical was, of course, DDT, a synthetic organochlorine developed by the Swiss in the 1930s. Compared to then-available compounds, DDT was a near-miraculous solution to a spectrum of agricultural and human health problems. It was uniquely persistent; once applied, DDT remained lethal to pests far longer than older formulations based on arsenic, lead, or copper. It required fewer applications, and could be diluted and still achieve
desired effects. Most important, it was essentially non-toxic to humans. In fact, in the closing years of the war it proved critical to preventing outbreaks of typhus and malaria, and scenes of U.S. soldiers dusting refugees with DDT powder became commonplace. It was also comparatively inexpensive, and it had multiple applications in agriculture, fighting vector-borne diseases, and controlling and eradicating common house-hold pests-the list went on and on as scientists unlocked ever more uses for this wonder chemical and others like it. It was, without hyperbole, a technological revolution. There were, to be sure, early cautions raised about the lethality of these new compounds to beneficial insects (e.g., honeybees), their lack of efficacy on some crops or pests, and the potential for chemical accumulation in body fats and organs. However, such cautions were vague and based on incomplete information, and as such were easily swept aside in the frenetic rush to acquire and use the new products [6]. Overall opinion was that with “proper use” the new formulations were safer and more effective than anything known previously. Use of the new compounds grew dramatically over a very short period of time for more purposes than the even their developers envisioned, and enthusiasm for the new technologies soon permeated consumer consciousness. “The publicity given DDT,” one food company executive remarked in 1950, “might well be envied by any Hollywood movie star” [7]. Popular magazines breathlessly reported each new pestcontrol breakthrough, while a chemical industry excited by the enormous commercial potential for their new products extolled their virtues to a society receptive to the capacity of technology to make their lives cleaner, safer, and more materially comfortable. To be sure, promoters of pesticides did worry about possible problems arising out of the new chemical age. Farmers and other major users worried about the quality and efficacy of their purchases, a concern warranted by an inundation of new products that in many cases were worthless or even dangerous [8]. Their concerns were shared by major chemical firms eager to keep out “unfair” competition and safeguard their growing markets, and by the farm community’s governmental patrons in Congress and in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Congress in 1947 responded to these shared concerns with passage of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). FIFRA, which updated
the 1910 Insecticide Act, was essentially a labeling law that required chemical makers to register new products with the USDA and to promise that the product in question was effective as claimed and safe when used properly. However, the USDA bore the onus of proof on any decisions to restrict or ban a chemical for any reason beyond misrepresentation or outright fraud. From the vantage of hindsight, John Blodgett observed, FIFRA contained a number of serious flaws:
chronic effects of these new formulations to warrant alarm. Available testing procedures indicated that DDT and its kin were non-toxic when used properly, and, if not entirely safe, certainly were less dangerous to humans than the products derived from arsenics and leads that dominated pre-war pest control. Even those raising cautions admitted that the new synthetics, applied properly, were preferable to the older chemicals. The story that unfolded thereafter is well known. Use of the new chemicals literally exploded, reaching very quickly into every sector of U.S. (and then global) life, in the process transforming food production, the fight against pests and environmental diseases of all kind, and the very rhythms of human existence. In fact, it is hard today to imagine daily life without these chemicals. In the decades to follow, nearly unchecked pesticides use would generate accumulating evidence of their negative environmental and human health effects. Growing public concerns about the adverse effects of such chemicals, particularly following the controversy sparked by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962, would eventually lead to a ban on DDT use in the United States [10].More important, the emergence of strong and organized public concerns about the safety and environmental impacts of pesticides would lead to a major overhaul in FIFRA, 25 years after its enactment. The 1972 Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act (FEPCA) shifted FIFRA from a labeling law into a more
overtly regulatory framework with tighter product registration requirements and more explicit rules about product use. More important, it moved enforcement from the USDA to the new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and gave it the authority to determine what types of data were to be submitted with each application and new procedures with which to cancel or suspend a product that posed unreasonable environmental effects. Forty years later FIFRA, as amended by FEPCA and adjusted by subsequent legislative action, as interpreted by the courts, and as defined by the EPA in the routines of implementation, remains the nation’s basic framework for regulating any substance for which its producer make claims on its capacity to fight or eliminate a range of environmental pests or diseases. �owhere, of course, does FIFRA mention nanoparticles. 26.3 The “Problem” of NanoIn March 2010, a decade into the “�anotechnology Era,” AOL News released a multi-part series on nanotechnology by investigative reporter Andrew Schneider. The series-The Nanotech Gamble: Bold Science, Big Money, Growing Risks-made several broad claims [11]: • �anoparticles may cause disease and death-yet government is doing little to address these concerns. • �ano-foods are coming soon-yet without adequate
government oversight, evoking images of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). • Promoters of nanotechnology are emphasizing technological innovation and economic growth over concerns about worker safety or consumer health. • Billions are being spent on basic science and technology development-but relatively little on environmental, health, and safety (EHS) research. • �o single federal agency is in charge of research or decision-making on nanotechnology EHS concerns-producers thus have considerable latitude in action, and are using their influence in Congress to stall proposed reform efforts. • While the rush to commercialize nanomaterials has not yet sparked a GMO-like backlash, that may change if citizens become alarmed about the health and safety of nanoparticles.
