ABSTRACT
For at least a decade, a chorus of defense analysts, government officials, and military officers have argued that the growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and information technology will drastically alter the character and conduct of future wars, yielding a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The idea that the emergence of new technology, combined with innovative operational concepts and organizations, would transform the conduct of war, first appeared in Soviet military writings in the late 1970s (Goure and Deane 1984). It was, however, the seeming ease with which the United States-led coalition defeated Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War that led many observers in the United States (US) and elsewhere to conclude that significant changes in the character of warfare were underway (Cohen 1996). Since the mid-1990s, exploiting the emerging RMA has been an explicit goal of the Department of Defense (DoD). Each of the Services has devoted considerable attention to developing new technology, as well as the concepts and organizations needed to employ it effectively.
