ABSTRACT
Since the Chinese communist armed forces were founded in 1927, the basic military dilemma facing them has been that of developing strategies for defeating adversaries that have superior weapons and equipment. The Soviet ground forces are complemented by equally improved capabilities in strategic weapons and air and naval forces. In addition to size, Mao Zedong believed that the Red Army had the additional advantage of extensive maneuvering space. The shift in basic strategic principles involved in the decision to defend the cities creates an image of a people's war that is distinctly different from that provided in Mao's essays and by his conduct of the war against Japan. Cities are no longer the "pots and pans" that could be surrendered in the 1930s in order to maintain the fluid fronts that made Mao's strategy of protracted war so viable. The nuclear forces contribute to the deterrence by threatening a high cost should the USSR contemplate a nuclear assault.
