ABSTRACT
Mikhail Gorbachev’s administration has thoughtfully reassessed the USSR’s traditional anticoalition strategy toward the West. Unexpected international developments and persistent domestic economic problems and political conflicts have complicated this reassessment. Joseph Stalin’s successors have become increasingly sensitive to the shifting policies and institutional relationships of the Western Alliance. Gorbachev and his colleagues have experimented with diverse methods to reduce the West’s cohesiveness and to cooperate with a unified Western Alliance. The exacerbation of “interimperialist contradictions” was the cornerstone of the traditional anticoalition strategy but has been downgraded to the role of a selectively used tactic. Experimentation has been a central feature of the Gorbachev administration’s policy toward Western Europe, and difficulty in understanding developments and choosing among options have been central dilemmas. The USSR’s traditional anticoalition strategy toward the West has been modified but has not changed dramatically under Gorbachev. Gorbachev thinks that a cohesive Western Alliance can further the USSR’s security interests under various circumstances.
