ABSTRACT
The economy, even in 1914–1916, was surprisingly successful in producing war goods, particularly shell. The shell crisis essentially showed a failure of organisation, not a failure of the economy; and this was shown to be true in 1917, when huge quantities of shell had been accumulated – at least 3,000 rounds per gun in January 1917, far more than the Germans had – and were never used. Batteries would be split up; shell would be kept badly; the High Command had no idea of organising artillery; training was lax. Russian shell production started later, in mass, than did other countries’, but by mid-1916 Russian output was comparable with German – at least, given that two thirds of German shell output had to go to the Western Front. Throughout 1914, the Russian armies are said to have wrestled with a crippling shell shortage. Russia’s shortage of war goods therefore touches on a central issue, and is worth examining in this light.
