ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the under-appreciated problem of logical form: the move towards first-personal methods and theoretical statements in psychology, rather than impersonal ones modeled on the logical form of physics. It suggests that non-physicalist naturalism is preferable to physicalist naturalism. Before delving into the ramifications of the differences in logical form between impersonal physics and first-personal contemporary psychology, the chapter shows that there is conceptual space for a naturalist philosophy which is not physicalist. Several branches of contemporary psychology rely heavily upon statements in the first person, and theoretical statements about what social psychologists call "the self," the referent of the first-person pronoun. Physicalism and naturalism are two logically independent doctrines. Physicalists quite frequently base their physicalism explicitly upon reasons at odds with naturalism, such as philosophical intuitions or appeals to common sense. The chapter also suggests that unified scheme may be the relationship between physics and psychology.
