ABSTRACT

P. F. Strawson's doctrine of 'terms', that a sortal expression is ultimately to be taken as an individual name designating a single sortal universal. This chapter argues that Strawson treats sortals as predicates, being true or false of a subject, or 'applying to' a subject, predicates rest for their introduction upon a class of symbol which may serve to introduce subjects of predication, upon sortals. It discusses the 'grammatical criterion' for the subject-predicate distinction. Earlier Strawson has said that a predicate expression 'contains at least one finite form of a verb, in the indicative mood, which does not, within the limits of the B-expression form part of a complete sentence or clause'. The chapter also argues that Strawson even requires sortal expressions to be single names by illustration from his doctrine of 'terms' in relation to his 'category' criterion and thus that his doctrine of 'terms' is open to severe objection.