ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the value of resentment in the aftermath of atrocity. The upshot of the author's work is that respect for persons in the aftermath of atrocity need not demand anything like interpersonal forgiveness from survivors. The entire scholarly field of transitional justice and its conceptual ideals of reconciliation, forgiveness and conflict resolution, Brudholm argues, is guided by the possibility of restoration of trust and hope in the wake of mass atrocity. Brudholm ultimately argues that neglecting the moral significance of survivors affects post-atrocity is unfair and deeply offensive. Within the arena of transitional justice, Brudholm brings legitimacy to Amry's defense of resentment as a kind of conscientious objection to the political view that forgiveness is the only legitimate response to moral atrocity. Whereas traditionally transitional justice has been concerned with reconciliation based in the overcoming of difference, a recent radical movement has turned to agonism as a necessary condition for developing civil relations post-atrocity.
