ABSTRACT
NATO nuclear strategy has rested upon the twin pillars of flexible response and forward defense. In flexible response, NATO reserved the right to initiate nuclear operations if conventional forces were about to be overrun. NATO would make its stand at the former inter-German border. The expectation of many months of strategic warning preceding actual hostilities would give NATO as well as East European forces time to mobilize sufficient forces and equipment and to prepare adequate defensive positions to defend the aggression with conventional forces. The momentous events of 1989 and 1990 radically transformed NATO’s perception of the threat, resulting in serious questions about, and criticisms of, the Alliance’s military strategy in general and nuclear strategy in particular. At its July 1990 summit in London, NATO reaffirmed its continuing need for an “appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.” The self-congratulatory euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold War and the West’s apparent victory overlooks several uncomfortable political and military realities.
