ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the way the government and parliament of the Netherlands dealt with the democratic deficit in a specific area of security policy and parliamentary accountability, i.e. peacekeeping and more specifically, the participation of the Netherlands in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995. As part of UNPROFOR, the Dutch Battalion (Dutchbat) was responsible for protecting the UN Safe Haven of Srebrenica, but was unable to stop the invading Serbs, resulting in the death of approximately 7,000 civilians (NIOD, 2002). 1 This chapter sets out in some detail the background of a definite trend of growing parliamentary involvement in decision-making processes on the deployment of Dutch troops to peacekeeping missions, starting as early as the late 1970s, and describes the various ways and means of implementing the acquired right of parliaments' near formal consent before such a deployment. The chapter illustrates the difference between NATO operations as originally envisaged in the North Atlantic Treaty where no formal consent is required and peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions, both inside and outside NATO, where such consent is required before the Netherlands can participate in a mission. Finally, the chapter refers to changes in the Dutch Constitution, codifying this trend of growing parliamentary involvement. In short, UNPROFOR is used as a case study for the general issue of parliamentary oversight, though it should be stressed that both the measure of involvement and the nature of the operation – and specifically for the Netherlands – the dramatic end of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica are worth considering at length as a most interesting case with strong implications for the present day. The chapter covers a time span of some 20 years in all, but concentrates on the period 1992-1995.
