ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION As we have seen, the implications of the preceding (second) scenario include local interactions (exemplified by the increasing role of new social groups seeking to further their interests and aspirations) and interactions with the outside world through the internal-external dialectic or the struggle between local and external forces. There are many alternative outcomes, ranging from capitulation to the pressures exerted by external forces, acting in collusion with some local interest groups opposing attempts to achieve co-ordination and integration, to a response to those pressures and that opposition through endeavours to speed up the establishment of an Arab entity capable of protecting Arab interests and fulfilling Arab aspirations. The unification of the Arab world, from the Atlantic to the Gulf, is a dream that has fired the imagination of large sections of the Arab nation throughout this century. It is also one of the principal aims of many political movements in the Arab world, in which public opinion still largely rejects state nationalism and clings to the hope of incorporation in larger entities as a step towards Arab unity. 1
In the first scenario we reviewed the implications, consequences and costs of a continuation of the present course of events in the Arab countries. In the second scenario we attempted to analyse the prospective implications of intermediate forms of closer inter-Arab relations, with all the potential challenges and achievements that they might entail. We must now assess the feasibility of Arab aspirations towards unity. Since the first scenario portrayed decadence and fragmentation we must study the question of whether unity would be able to halt the process of decline, promote development and offer a better and final solution to the problem of fragmentation.
