ABSTRACT
Self-defense is recognized today as a self-evident right, requiring no specifi c justifi cation. Could someone under attack by another not be permitted to defend himself? As early as the fi rst century BCE, Cicero argued that “self-preservation is a law by nature.”1 Nevertheless, there are complicated situations in which the right to self-defense is problematic. In particular, its applicability in cases that do not constitute self-defense in the full sense of the word can be questioned, for example, a farmer who
shoots at youths stealing his apples, or someone who, upon witnessing an inebriated stranger threatening passers-by, wrestles him to the ground, injuring him in the process. A comprehensive treatment of the right to selfdefense2 should take into account such complications-de minimis attacks; disproportionality between the severity of the attack and the harm caused the attacker by the defender; self-defense by a third party; self-defense against an innocent aggressor (e.g., a psychotic aggressor); and so forth.
