ABSTRACT
In Western liberal democracies it is predominantly the institution of rights that defines the legal content of the status of citizenship. Preliminarily rights can be defined as ‘legal or moral recognition of choices or interests to which particular weight is attached’ (Reeve 2003b: 468). They are entitlements or permissions, which must be granted, respected and upheld by the state and other members of society. Rights are often enshrined in law, or claims may be made in absence of legal recognition, as demands that the law be changed to accommodate the right in line with perceived demands of morality (ibid.: 468). In the classical liberal formulation, rights are applied to individuals and are used to arbitrate conflict: they would not be necessary in a situation of consensus. This implies a particular type of relationship – one that is mediated by the state, which decides the boundaries of social ties in terms of those aspects of a subject that can legitimately be interfered with, and those that are the private domain of the individual. Rights therefore also have implications for the formation of subjectivity, and imply a particular type of subject. The possession of rights designates a bounded sphere of autonomy within which the individual is free to pursue their own interests, happiness and vision of the good life free from interference from other individuals, the state and society as a whole. Thus the concept of ‘rights’ in the liberal formulation assumes tension or struggle between the individual and community, and a definitive boundary between these two clearly distinguishable entities. This is not the only way in which rights can be formulated, but clearly questions concerning rights have much to do with the institution of boundaries between public and private spheres (which aspects of life can the state and society legitimately interfere with, and which should be protected?), and self/other relations (what is it that is constitutive of the self that has moral entitlements?).
