ABSTRACT
The effects of Tet were far-ranging, affecting the will of the American public, the credibility of intelligence, and the credibility of the leadership of both the military and the nation. Tet, in and of itself, was not the sole cause of these effects, but was the culmination point for a series of actions. In light of General Westmoreland’s prognostications to the public in November 1967 and the tainted intelligence used to propagate the ‘bankruptcy’ of the enemy, the effects of Tet must be re-examined. Tet would not have had the effect it did had the military focused on the enemy’s will and not the delusional crossover point. Tet would not have had the effect it did had intelligence understood the enemy’s will and not become fixated on declining enemy numbers, perpetuating the crossover delusion. Tet would not have had the effect it did had intelligence not manipulated the enemy’s numbers to avoid scrutiny of the crossover delusion. Tet would not have had the effect it did had the public not been told just over two months previously that the enemy was ‘bankrupt,’ in a public relations campaign to bolster support for the war based upon the crossover delusion.
