ABSTRACT
In late September 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave General Westmoreland a one-time authorization to use tear gas during an unspecified future operation of his choice. Almost immediately, members of the Administration began urging McNamara to direct the General to use it quickly so Washington could capitalize on the encouraging press generated by Operation Stomp. At a September 29 luncheon meeting, Undersecretary of State George Ball brought up another reason to push the General to use the gas quickly when he pointed out the International Red Cross was holding a conference in Geneva in early October and would almost certainly issue a statement condemning tear gas as a chemical weapon. Since such a statement would add fuel to the Communist propaganda campaign and likely stimulate journalists to revisit the issue, he urged the President to have Westmoreland conduct the operation within the next few days. McNamara, however, insisted the specific operation had to be selected for purely tactical reasons despite the potential political implications. If Washington forced Westmoreland to use tear gas in a timely but inappropriate situation, it could backfire and once again open the Administration up to intense public and political criticism. After the events of the previous March, it was just not worth the risk. McNamara felt it was imperative the general have the freedom to select the appropriate mission to continue emphasizing the humanitarian properties of tear gas and making the agents a reasonable alternative to traditional weapons. In the end, McNamara was able to convince the President to wait and give the General time to select the proper mission. The mission General Westmoreland ultimately chose was an operation to clear the enemy out of tunnels and bunkers hidden deep in a key section of enemy controlled jungle.1
