ABSTRACT
If Jack Bitton was an EGIS spy then he probably was the only Egyptian strategic HUMINT asset before and during the 1967 war. Unfortunately, measuring Bitton’s impact on Egyptian decision-making requires more verifiable details about him and his reporting than EGIS has so far permitted.16 For many Egyptians, however, Bitton is Egypt’s master spy and the subject of a highly popular television series in the late 1980s.17 Other Egyptian HUMINT assets at this time included the military attachés abroad, Palestinian infiltrators and Arab residents of Israel who photographed military facilities and gathered open source literature.18 MID also relied on reconnaissance bases in Gaza and Sinai, which served as visual observation posts and centers for contacts with Palestinian or Bedouin scouts. These posts housed some of the MID’s SIGINT equipment which provided early warning of Israel’s 5 June attack until captured by the IDF.19 Critically, control of the MID’s Reconnaissance Branch was transferred from the MID to the General Staff before the war with the result that some tactical intelligence – such as scouting reports of Israeli war preparations – never reached MID analysts.20 Egyptian technical intelligence was equally lacking before the war. The air force leadership was reluctant to deploy its photo reconnaissance jets close to or over the border because it feared Israeli retaliation. MID Director Sadiq recalled that the air force flew only two reconnaissance sorties over southern Israel in the days leading up to the war and both photographed the wrong targets.21 Consequently, Egypt had little or no relevant imagery intelligence of the IDF’s peacetime posture let alone wartime deployments. In fact, it has been alleged that much of what passed for Egyptian imagery intelligence of southern Israel dated back to World War II.22 There is little information on Egyptian SIGINT capabilities before the war. The MID probably intercepted unencrypted Israel tactical communications through its Gaza and Sinai SIGINT sites, but is not clear if Israeli encryption was ever broken. The mukhabarat’s abilities to exploit Israeli communications were further limited by its lack of Hebrew linguists and experienced analysts who could put SIGINT data in context.23
