ABSTRACT
There is an unusual consensus in the Russian political elite that the country is
a ‘great power’, although there are disagreements over what a great power
should look like in the post-Cold War era. America on its own today spends
more than half of all the world’s military allocations, a concentration of power
that even Rome at its height could not emulate. In this context, Russia’s claim
to be a great power has an inherent revisionist dynamic. The country’s mere
existence as an independent source of influence, power and civilisational
authority is perceived by some as a challenge to the status quo. Russia’s identity is bound up with a view of itself as an autonomous power with a dis-
tinctive role to play in the Eurasian region and in the world at large. With
enormous reserves of hydrocarbons and other natural resources, enjoying huge
technological and cultural achievements, and with a history as an ally in the
defeat of continental dictators, Russia considers itself different from other
medium-ranking powers. Although in the 1990s it found itself trapped in
poverty amidst a sea of plenty, its location at the Eastern end of the European
sphere of prosperity suggested that sooner rather than later its fortunes would improve. The problem facing Putin was how to convert potential into reality.
He was well aware of the great gulf between rhetoric and reality, and sought
to tailor Russia’s ambitions to feasibility while not losing sight of what made
Russia different. Within the framework of what we call a ‘new realism’,
Putin sought to craft a policy that asserted Russia’s national interests while
integrating into the world community. The shedding of exaggerated illusions
about Russia’s status in the world, however, did not mean that the rest of the
world would be willing to accept Russia into the international community on its own terms. Putin’s new realism was devised precisely at a time when much
of the Western world was seized by what Sergei Karaganov calls ‘democratic
messianism’.2 The ‘new realism’ emerging in Russia came into contradiction
with the West’s focus on the ‘regime question’, the quality of Russia’s democracy.
For over two decades since Mikhail Gorbachev launched perestroika in 1985,
Russia has been engaged in a grandiose modernisation process. An essential
part of this has been the attempt to find a new relationship with the devel-
oped West, but a satisfactory balance between integration and autonomy has
not yet been found.3 The dual and contradictory position of Russia on the
world stage on Putin’s accession in 2000 has been characterised as follows.
