ABSTRACT
Since the announcement of China’s BRI and subsequent infrastructural initiatives advanced by Japan, Sino-Japanese relations in this field have been predominantly interpreted as a zero-sum-game rivalry. This chapter nuances this interpretation with the consideration of structural economic factors outside strictly hard-power distribution between states. I stress the underappreciated dynamics of Japan’s cooperation with China, Japan’s pre-BRI infrastructural and concessional lending, as well as Japan’s accommodation of China in those fields, contrasting them with oft-emphasised competitive patterns. In terms of empirical contribution, this chapter holds that the Abe government used infrastructure and associated financing as carrots-and-sticks statecraft tools in hedging against China through Japanese strategic communications and financial policies, including the utilisation of infrastructure-themed rhetoric to substantiate the concept of the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, the promotion of narratives of Sino-Japanese infrastructural rivalry and debt-trap diplomacy targeted not only the hedging vis-à-vis China, but also the mercantilist promotion of Japan’s infrastructural exports to preserve its competitive advantage in this industry, domestically important for the Japanese ruling coalition.
