ABSTRACT
Journalists do far better with moral philosophy than they do with epistemology – but not, of course, in modes aping or deepening philosophical inquiry. Journalistic ‘morality’ is grounded, in effect, in utilitarian ethics and the injunction: Do No Harm. This Harm Principle operates both between journalist and reader/receiver, and between journalist and subject. Receivers are a third party to the relationship journalists have with their subjects, and, despite the rise of technologically-enabled interaction, the connection between them is essentially one-way and the duty of care owed them is reduced. Media effects research, though, has concentrated on this mass of receivers. This is problematic because neither causation nor even influence are easily determinable. Even if a causal connection can be established, a distinction in the type of effect – whether it is externally perceivable or self-attested – is not much made. And actually, despite moral panics, the evidence of significant social media impact is surprisingly elusive. The less-studied journalists’ relationship with the subject is more of a two-way street, but their duty of care is greater, involving the clear possibility of their work having easily comprehended and sometimes profound effects. Overall though, despite such acute ethical consequences, even the most self-reflexive moral journalists cannot afford to be very philosophical.
