ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the definitions of commitment Amartya Sen offers in ‘Rational Fools’. His initial definition divulges nothing about the agent’s reason or goal for making a choice based on commitment, whilst his second, ‘more inclusive’, definition raises this aspect explicitly. The chapter explores the nature of the reasons on which one must act if one’s choice is to be based on commitment. It provides clarification on the question whether preferences, as Sen understands them, constitute a type of reason for choosing or whether preferences are to be classified as non-reason-based motivations for choice. The chapter addresses the phenomenon of mixed motives, that is, being prompted to perform a certain action by different sources of motivation. It shows how the concept of altruism is best positioned in relation to sympathy and commitment. The foregoing, then, leads to an additional restriction on the types of reason which are compatible with making choices based on commitment.
