ABSTRACT

The work of the Classic Pragmatists, especially William James and J. Dewey, had faded quickly from view because Pragmatism was bad philosophy. Richard Rorty, then, was reviving pragmatic ideas, arguments, and conceptions of philosophical inquiry that critics had shown were outright or disguised subjectivism. According to James and Dewey, insight into the problems of philosophy could be achieved only if one appreciated the inextricable ties that bound both sides of the dualisms. The Positivists’ Criterion of Cognitive Significance did rule a number of metaphysical issues meaningless, but unlike the Pragmatic Maxim, it brought with it the seeds of others, for it depended on sharp theoretical/observational and meaning/fact dualisms that firmed up intuitions of an analytic/synthetic distinction. Philosophers still think it important to decide which side of the dualisms they are on, and spend much time defending the positions they take. If one is to be a naturalist, the mental and intentional must be reducible to a material base.