ABSTRACT
William James and J. Dewey often remark that there was more criticism of their pragmatic account of truth than understanding. The Pragmatists’ analysis of truth and inquiry reverse the direction of realist analyses. They find the realists’ intuitions about correspondence and reality understandable, but, as with the dictionary definition of truth, only suggestive. The Pragmatists argue that the realist position presupposes a mistaken view of language and, when fleshed out, an incoherent understanding of Reality. Pragmatists argue that it is best to understand the function of language, theories, and inquiry in general as instrumental. Positing propositions as explanatory entities stands in the way of developing satisfactory theories of meaning and reference that fit how languages actually work in thought and communication. The Pragmatists’ naturalist account of language and meaning eschews their use. The Pragmatists’ account of the development of concepts over time has an even more radical implication.
