ABSTRACT
Blatant inequalities prevail when subsidies are paid on gross export-dollars and the same amount of taxpayers' money is given to two manufacturers with diverse export performances. Techniques to subsidise pure VALAD dollars are obviously preferable to those subsidising gross export-dollars. The handicaps of the latter approach can be diminished by subsidising gross export-dollars on a sliding scale when account is taken of the guestimated percentage of VALAD within the total sales value. The Venezuelan export zealots worked on the assumption that each net export-dollar of manufacturing industry deserved a 30 per cent bonus. A motley assortment of multiple exchange rates is spawned when export zealots in government offices, equipped with discretionary powers, tailor subsidies to individual exporters or special export consignments. Japan is one of the strange exceptions which actually give export incentives for invisibles which are not available for visible exports.
