ABSTRACT
The Paris Agreement recognized two administrations, two armed forces, and two zones of control in the territory of South Vietnam. But Thieu stood firm on "four no's"—no negotiations with the enemy, no communist activity in the South, no coalition government, no surrender of territory. The "four no's" ruled out implementation of the Paris Agreement's political articles, mocked the idea of compromise, and invited the Communists to respond in kind. The Communists for a while considered themselves to be weaker than Saigon. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam had grown, it had adequate reserves, and though US aid was decreasing, that aid was abundant. On the revolutionary side, "liberated areas" were thinly populated, many party cells were cut off from the people, and irregular forces were weak. The postwar war dispirited ordinary citizens on both sides. But on Saigon's side despair turned to disgust as the Thieu regime reverted to earlier ways.
