ABSTRACT
The detente policy was short-lived because Soviet and American policymakers could not reconcile their different definitions of detente. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin believed detente was ‘‘to a certain extent buried in the fields of Soviet-American rivalry in the Third World.’’ The first official US opposition to these events came on July 10, when President Carter warned the Soviets that Sharansky’s imminent trial would undermine détente relations. Previously, Carter appeared ready to confront the Soviets in a June 7 speech at the US Naval Academy, concluding with the words ‘‘The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.’’ According to Soviet documents in the April 2004 Cold War International History Project’s Bulletin, Gorbachev told Najib he could expect Soviet aid in reconstructing Afghanistan’s economy if Najib carried out a policy for national reconciliation for all Afghan factions including Pakistani exiles.
