ABSTRACT
The chapter considers the case of the Kashmir conflict (1989–2001) between Pakistan and India in order to analyze the efficacy of Pakistan’s military-centred national security state approach. The Kashmir conflict has been one of the longest, unresolved military conflicts in the contemporary world. During 1989–2001, Islamabad attempted to find military and diplomatic solutions to the conflict but failed. Within national security state, the ISI used Islamic militancy as a strategic tool to counter Indian military power and to gain international attention to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In 1999, the Pakistani military also instigated a limited war in Kargil to gain a strategic advantage over India in Kashmir. The chapter explains that the use of proxy war not only affected the Kashmiri nationalist movement for independence but also weakened Pakistan’s diplomatic standing over the Kashmir issue. Moreover, the proxy war largely contributed to the internal security threat to Pakistan when General Musharraf made a U-turn on Kashmir policy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The civilian leadership tried to find a political solution of the Kashmir conflict through peace talks with India, but it was thwarted by the Pakistani military using the issue of national security. The Kashmir case (1989–2001) confirms that Pakistan’s national security state approach not only failed to resolve the Kashmir issue but exacerbated security threats.
